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Abstract 
Since 2010 the government in England has committed to accelerating the expansion 
of academies (‘state-funded independent schools’) through displacing the role of 
local government as principal manager and overseer of schools.  In response 
increasing numbers of schools are embracing the co-operative trust model to 
improve economies of scale, facilitate stakeholding and community resilience and 
resist capture from the monopolising tendencies of some large multi-academy trusts 
seeking wholesale takeover of certain underperforming schools.  Yet there are 
concerns that co-operative schools do not represent a radical departure from 
routines of neoliberalism – defined by managerial deference, technocratic efficiency, 
upward accountability and performativity – despite clear signs that co-operative 
schools promote themselves as jointly-owned, democratically-controlled enterprises.  
In this paper I adopt a ‘processual view of neoliberalisation’ (Peck and Tickell 2002) 
to complicate the idea that co-operative schools can be judged in binary terms of 
‘either/or’ – neoliberal or democratic, exclusionary or participatory – and instead 
point to the variegated organisational life of co-operative schools and their messy 
actualities as they straddle competing and sometimes conflicting sets of interests, 
motives and demands in their practice of school governance. 
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Routines of neoliberal governance 
Like many countries around the globe – Australia (Savage, Seller and Gorur 2013), 
Chile (Verger, Bonal and Zancajo 2016), Sweden (Lundahl 2013), the US (Hursh 
2006), Spain (Olmedo and Eduardo 2013) and Slovakia (Kaščák and Pupala 2014) – 
England is committed to a ‘mixed economy’ of education.  A mixed economy of 
education typically consists of both state regulation and deregulation; tight, 
centralised accountability and devolved management; government-managed 
bureaucracies and private monopolies; and public ownership and privatisation (Ball 
and Junemann 2012; Gunter 2015; Ozga 2009; Wilkins 2017).  Central to a mixed 
economy of education therefore are private providers and new intermediary actors 
and agencies (Rhodes 2007), namely charities, businesses and social enterprises, 
which supplement the formal authority of government and place limits on the 
capacity of government to intervene in the running of schools.  Yet despite the 
appearance of a ‘reluctant state’ (Ball 2012, p. 89), schools in England do not 
experience unconditional freedoms and autonomy to govern themselves.  Instead 
they possess something akin to conditional autonomy as central government uses 
the political machinations of policy, particularly funding agreements, performance 
benchmarking, private sponsorship and attrition through inspection and high-stakes 
testing, to exercise greater control over the internal operations and priorities of 
schools.   
4 
 
 
Take academies in England.  Academies refer to ‘state-funded independent schools’ 
previously maintained by local government.  Unlike local government-run schools 
who operate under the discretionary powers of civil servants and elected councillors, 
academies and the people who run them acquire powers to take ownership of the 
land and buildings, set the curriculum and admissions policy, manage budget 
spending, employ staff directly and source their own suppliers and professional 
advisers.  Some schools voluntarily convert to academy status (known as ‘converter 
academies’) while other schools (known as ‘sponsored academies’) are made 
eligible for takeover by a sponsor due to having ‘serious weaknesses’ or requiring 
‘special measures’ under section 44(2) of the Education Act 2005.  Sponsored 
academies are typically stripped of their assets and powers to self-determination and 
brought under the exclusive authority of a board of trustees who, through the 
acquisition of a foundation or trust, run the school pursuant with a contract with the 
Secretary of State.  In practice, this means less autonomy for some schools and their 
strict compliance with standard operational procedures in terms of teaching, learning 
and assessment (Stewart 2016).  This is not to say that converter academies 
possess significantly more ‘freedom’ than sponsored academies, albeit their 
‘negative freedom’ (freedom from certain forms of external influence, namely local 
government interference) is greater than their ‘positive freedom’ (freedom to pursue 
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their own interests) (Fromm 2001).  In both cases, schools are compelled to behave 
as businesses and sustain themselves as ‘high-reliability’ organisations (Reynolds 
2010, p. 18), all of which demand proficiency in auditing, performance management 
and compliance checking (Wilkins 2016).   
 
The limited positive freedom experienced by many schools is partly due to a 
‘neurotic government’ (Wilkins and Olmedo 2018, p. 7) unable to fully accept the 
vagaries of its own reform, namely the dispersal of significant instructional, financial 
and operational powers away from the centre and outward toward schools.  Hence 
governments in favour of decentralised education planning typically pursue forms of 
‘hard governance’, ‘things like target-setting, performance management, benchmarks 
and indicators, data use to foster competition, and so on’ (Clarke and Ozga 2012, p. 
1).  These methods or techniques of government – what might be termed ‘routines of 
neoliberal governance’ (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 384) – function to organise 
schools as navigable spaces of replicable and measurable ‘quality’, of 
‘commensurability, equivalence and comparative performance’ (Lingard, Martino and 
Rezai-Rashti 2016, p. 542), so that they are amenable to the scrutiny and statistical 
mapping of external regulators and funders as well as complementary to market 
conceptions of ‘public accountability’, narrowly conceived through the lexicon of 
contract, corporate, performative and consumer terminology (Ranson 2010).  Here 
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governance broadly refers to the design and perfection of structures and processes 
under which behaviour management and administrative systems may operate 
successfully, especially among acentred, polycentric systems of education 
characterised by self-organisation or ‘heterarchy’ (Olmedo, Bailey and Ball 2013).  
The extent to which these structures and processes can be considered thoroughly 
‘neoliberalised’ is problematic however, as will be evidenced later in the paper.  The 
organisational life of schools in England at least are better conceptualised as 
variegated – contingent, dynamic and contradictory. 
 
The processual life of neoliberalisation 
In order to capture such variegation, I adopt a ‘processual view of neoliberalization’ 
(Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 383) that emphasises the ‘variegated character of 
neoliberalization processes’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 184). A 
processual view of neoliberalisation acknowledges the unevenness by which 
routines of neoliberalism are lived and embodied through the labour of socially 
situated actors.  A key focus of this paper therefore is the different ethical 
imperatives, political commitments and social responsibilities framing such labour as 
well as the multiplicity of governmental programs and rationalities that intervene to 
augment, animate and constrain the conditions in which subjects labour to produce.  
As Li (2007, p. 13) observes, 'what appears to be rational landscape design or 
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‘management’ is the serendipitous outcome of everyday practices that have quite 
disparate motives'.  A focus of this paper is the ways in which school leaders and 
governors working in a co-operative trust (a charitable company jointly set up 
schools who elect to run themselves as academies pursuant with a funding 
agreement with the Secretary of State) engage in grafting together competing and 
sometimes conflicting sets of interests, motives and demands through their practice 
of school governance.  Here school governance is defined as a field of intervention 
inhabited by various stakeholders, be they community members, parents, teachers, 
staff members, students, or business leaders, who bring lay and professional 
judgements to bear upon the actions of those who run schools, namely head 
teachers and middle leaders.  The primary task of school governance (narrowly 
conceived) is to ensure that schools are publicly accountable – properly audited and 
monitored, high achieving, financially sustainable, law compliant, non-discriminatory 
and so on.  In this sense school governance replaces direct steering from the centre 
– a federal or central government for example.   
 
The aim of this paper is twofold.  First, I intend to demonstrate the value and 
application of a ‘processual view of neoliberalisation’ (ibid) to tracing the complex 
terrain on which school leaders and governors working in a co-operative trust 
accommodate and negotiate different sets of interests and demands in their practice 
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of school governance.  This includes a focus on the problematic alignments arising 
from such accommodations and negotiations and the different ways these 
alignments work with and against some of the wider economic and political 
pressures sustained by the project of neoliberalism and its exigencies, namely 
managerial deference, technocratic efficiency, upward accountability and 
performativity.  And second, I use these insights to draw attention to some of the 
tensions and dilemmas resulting from such problematic alignments as evidence of 
the messy actualities of co-operative school governance.  These insights are used in 
turn to complicate some narratives which appear to construct co-operative schools 
as exclusively participatory, democratic organisations (Allen 2017; Audsley and Cook 
2012; Davidge, Facer and Schostak 2015), although some of these narratives are 
presented as ideals rather than reflecting actually existing practice. 
 
In the field of ‘education governance’ (broadly conceived, see Wilkins and Olmedo 
2018) there are numerous interacting, complementary forces that work to position 
schools within a rational landscape of market determinism, key among them are 
league table placing, school inspections, school choice and competition more 
generally.  Schools organise their internal operations to meet these expectations, 
which they do through carefully positioning themselves as unique and reputable 
providers in a crowded field of choice (Wilkins 2012); paying consultants to perform 
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‘mocksteads’ of their school in preparation for genuine inspections from the school’s 
inspectorate, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills 
(Ofsted); reducing teaching and student learning to measures of productivity, 
efficiency and outputs or ‘performativity’ (Ball 2003); and affirming corporate 
managerial framings of accountability as key mechanisms for enhancing the 
legitimacy of schools as publicly accountable institutions (Ranson 2010).  These 
trends in education governance are sometimes characterised as ‘neoliberal’ in that 
they signify the subsuming of public powers and utilities within an economic logic or 
enterprise form that ‘involves a specific and consequential organization of the social, 
the subject, and the state’ (Brown 2006, p. 693).  Yet, as Jessop (2016, p. 11) 
observes, 'institutional orders and social relations outside the immediate logic of 
valorization typically have their own values and norms, bases of social inclusion or 
exclusion, their own forms of structured conflict, and so forth, social forces will seek 
to resist marketization in the name of defending the autonomy of these spheres', 
albeit still invoking imperatives of the market when it suits their own interests. 
 
On this account, routines of neoliberal governance are not totalizing or deterministic, 
as if human action/response is simply the embodiment of the discursive 
accomplishments of hegemonic projects and governmental rationalities (rational 
consensus, perfect control and system design).  Nor do instantiations of routines of 
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neoliberal governance (competitive self-interest or possessive individualism, 
managerial deference and market-ready or market-responsive behaviours) follow a 
logical progression making them systemic and predictable across spaces and 
institutions; that is, ‘always and everywhere in the same homogenous and singular 
outcome as the sequencing is predefined’ (Springer 2015, p. 7).  Rather, the formal 
practice of policy and administration tends to be always messy, complicated work.  
This brings into perspective ‘the complexity of interacting forces rather than 
assuming that governmental practice in a plurality of sites flows uniformly from the 
big transformations produced by neoliberalism’ (Newman 2007, p. 54).  As Mitchell 
and Lizotte (2016, p. 224) remind us, it is important to remain circumspect of the 
‘apparent seamlessness’ with which policy is translated into the ‘consciousness and 
practices of individuals and groups’.   
 
From this perspective, routines of neoliberal governance cannot be analysed in 
isolation from the kinds of agency and ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ (Jessop and Sum 2016, 
p. 108) that shape and refract their development or non-development.  The idea here 
is that routines of neoliberal governance require work so that their conditions and 
effects can be made real (or embodied).  Therefore, it is important to trace 
empirically the everyday labour of socially situated actors engaged in processes of 
assembling a ‘variety of neoliberalisms’ (Plehwe 2009, p. 3).  A key focus of this 
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paper therefore is to examine how routines of neoliberal governance – particularly, 
upward accountability, competitive advantage and efficiency – are differently 
appropriated, negotiated and combined as organising principles of school 
governance in a co-operative trust, and to draw attention to the tensions and struggle 
over values and norms arising from these problematic alignments within an ‘inherited 
institutional landscape’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 184) such as the co-
operative movement. 
 
The co-operative turn 
Central to education reforms introduced by New Labour in 2000, enshrined in policy 
in 2005 (DfES 2005; also see 2006 Education and Inspections Act), and later 
adopted by the Coalition government in 2010 (Academies Act 2010), is a radical 
programme of education reform that allows schools to join or create their own 
foundations or trusts so that they may opt out of local government control.  Some 
trusts remain within the parameters of local government control however, as 
evidenced by local government authorities in the North-West London borough of 
Camden who sought to become academy sponsors by setting up their own trusts 
(Neville 2016).  At the time of writing, statistics released by the DfE (2018) indicate 
there are 7,317 open academies representing 30% of the total number of primary, 
secondary, special, and alternative provision schools in England.  Many of these 
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schools operate in trusts of more than one school, sometimes called ‘sponsored 
academies’ or Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs), equivalent to 68% or roughly two-thirds 
of the total number of open academies.  The remaining open academies (equivalent 
to 1,891 schools) are ‘converter academies’ or ‘stand-alone’ schools with no formal 
links to other schools in the form of shared management, leadership or governance 
(DfE 2017). 
 
The development of the academies programme has attracted huge controversy over 
the years with emerging evidence of financial scandal and mismanagement (BBC 
2013), related party transactions and conflicts of interest (Boffey 2013), selective 
admission policies fuelling social segregation (Harris and Vasagar 2012), trust CEOs 
claiming inordinate salaries (Hazell 2016) and academy conversions lacking 
democratic consultation (Smith 2011).  Moreover, a furore has erupted over 
escalating procurement and legal costs attached to converting local government-run 
schools to academies and building new free schools (Yorke 2017) despite cuts to 
public spending on education and mounting concerns of a ‘school funding crisis’ 
(Ratcliffe 2017).  The rise in popularity of co-operative schools in England – 
numbering 850 co-operative foundation trusts and co-operative academies at the 
time of writing – are in part a response to this controversy, especially claims that 
academies are not democratically accountable since they possess powers to limit or 
13 
 
remove entirely the potential for wider consultation and community involvement in 
school governance (now largely circumscribed by the actions of a few professional, 
skilled folk) (Coughlan 2016; Hatcher 2006; Mansell 2013; Sleigh 2013).  With large 
numbers of academies in England now operating outside a local government 
democratic mandate which regards schools as ‘public goods’, co-operative schools 
set themselves apart through adopting co-operative values and principles as their 
value structure, namely ‘mutual support through sharing good practice’ and ‘good 
governance through sound membership based structures that guarantee 
involvement for all the key stakeholders’ (The Schools Co-operative Society 2016).  
The ‘hollowing out’ of local government and the threat of isolationism in an 
increasingly competitive education landscape also means that large numbers of 
schools are seeking opportunities to pool their resources, jointly buy-in services and 
share expertise, preferably through co-operative, democratic means that sustains 
stakeholder models of school governance.  As Davidge, Facer and Schostak (2015, 
p. 61) argue, ‘the legal instruments, the will and the resources are available to 
provide a real alternative to state, private and corporate sponsorship of competition 
as the only approach to the organisation of the mainstream school system’. 
 
From its early nineteenth century beginnings when socialist pioneer Robert Owen 
(1826) called for greater collective well-being and equality amongst his workers – in 
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effect seeking to ‘replace the profit motive with the fruits of co-operation, and the 
vices of individualism with mutuality’ (Thompson in Friberg, 2011, p. 118) – to its 
later incarnation during the 1980s when ‘co-operative associations also conflicted 
with the neo-conservative model of individualised ‘classless’ consumerism and the 
New Right’s desire to disempower organised labour’ (Webster et al. 2012, p. 2), the 
co-operative movement has sometimes presented itself as a benevolent form of 
industrialism antithetical to forms of predatory capitalism that engenders asymmetric 
power relationships between capitalists and workers (Marx 1990).  More specifically, 
co-operative organisations stand opposed to ‘investor-led corporate capitalism’ with 
its ‘propensity to rampant and perilous financial speculation, its lack of accountability 
to shareholders and governments, its dubious morality and its tendency to 
exacerbate social and economic inequalities’ (Webster et al. 2012, p. 9).   
 
Instead the co-operative movement promotes jointly-owned, democratically-
controlled, self-help enterprises run by workers in the case of worker co-operatives 
and consumer members in the case of consumer co-operatives, each one driven by 
mutual interest rather than pecuniary interest.  Co-operative schools on the other 
hand can be classified as ‘hybrid’ organisations (Woodin 2015, p. 6) given they are 
regulated like other publicly-funded schools but have co-operative principles grafted 
onto them.  This is most evident in the way co-operative schools appear to work 
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against the grain of asymmetric power relationships that typically endure within some 
academies where previously community-run governing bodies are being downsized 
or abandoned entirely to meet government demands for ‘business people’ (GOV.UK 
2013) and people with the ‘right skills’ (GOV.UK 2015) who can open up the internal 
operation of schools to greater public scrutiny from external regulators and funders.  
Undercutting these trends, co-operative schools in England stand opposed to the 
anti-localism, anti-democratic fervour of recent government initiatives aimed at 
undermining stakeholder models of school governance in favour of private 
monopolies and corporate sponsorship led by international edu-businesses, venture 
philanthropists and private equity investors (Wilkins 2017).  Instead, co-operative 
schools promote civic participation, democratic control and community resilience as 
key drivers of their legitimacy as publicly accountable institutions.  To achieve this, 
co-operative schools echo the kinds of governance arrangements to be found among 
soft federations – sometimes called ‘collaborative trusts’ – where there is greater 
power-sharing supported through the creation of joint, cross-school committees with 
delegated powers (Salokangas and Chapman 2014).   
 
In the specific case of co-operative trust schools, power-sharing and co-operation is 
notionally achieved by enabling pupils, teachers, parents, local people, employers 
and other member groups (universities and schools) to join the board of trustees.  
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The board of trustees is a separate legal entity who act as employer and finance 
manager for schools within the cluster, and who in turn elect some of the members 
of the school’s governing body (the principal agents monitoring the financial and 
educational performance of the school) as well as elect representatives to a 
‘stakeholder forum’ to present their views to the school leaders and governors.  For 
many, therefore, co-operative values and organisational forms offer up opportunities 
to produce schools that are democratically-accountable, politically-engaged, civic 
organisations (Dorling 2016; Mansell 2011).   
 
Yet co-operative schools, like all schools in receipt in public funding, are answerable 
to external funders and regulators (the Education and Skills Funding Agency and the 
school’s inspectorate, Ofsted, for example) which require strong internal scrutiny and 
professional governance in the absence of local government oversight.  Moreover, 
co-operative schools operate under the separate legal entity of a trust, albeit function 
with a degree of autonomy within that arrangement and sometimes within the 
admission authority of the local government.  Other trust setups, notably MATs or 
‘hard federation’ setups, are not directly accountable to local government – other 
than on matters of special needs and exclusions, as is required of all state-funded 
schools – but primarily to their trustees who in turn are accountable to central 
government vis-à-vis a funding agreement.  This includes responsibility for 
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management overheads in the form of employment disputers, contractual issues and 
premises management as well as significant responsibilities for the financial and 
educational performance of the school.   
 
A requirement for schools looking to convert to academy status is that their 
governing bodies demonstrate sufficient ‘professionalism’ (Wilkins 2016) and a 
sharper focus on business management theories and practices or ‘corporate 
accountability’ (Ranson 2010) to the satisfaction of external funders and regulators.  
This has specific and tangible consequences for the governance of all schools and 
the capacity of schools to resist or refuse routines of neoliberal governance.  In the 
case of co-operative schools, recent research suggests that board of trustee 
membership is sometimes conditional on the appointee demonstrating relevant skills 
and expertise to run a school effectively: ‘This calls into question the possibilities and 
conditions for open and voluntary membership – one of the fundamental principles of 
membership outlined by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA)’ (Davidge 2014, 
p. 163).   
 
The suggestion here is that co-operative schools are always already vulnerable to 
capture from neoliberal appropriation – managerial deference, expert-analytic 
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assessment, upward accountability and cultures of performativity.  At the same time, 
co-operative values do not serve any specific ‘blueprint’ or ‘framework’, as pointed 
out by former Principal and Chief Executive of the Co-operative College, Mervyn 
Wilson (quoted in Bradbury 2013).  Co-operative schools are designed to be adapted 
locally for the needs of different communities, thus taking on ‘highly diverse forms 
when they are recontextualised within the contexts of existing local cultures and 
priorities’ (Facer, Thorpe and Shaw 2012, p. 333).  At the same time, there are limits 
to local adaption and translation given many of the government and extra-
government priorities and constraints already outlined above.  
 
From this perspective, co-operative schools are complex assemblages as school 
leaders and governors continually work to assert their difference from other dominant 
models of ‘academisation’ as well as promote the co-operative brand more generally.  
This means paying close attention to the ways in which school leaders and 
governors manage any contradictions arising from their shifting positioning as 
promoters of the co-operative model (but simultaneously working beyond any 
prescribed ‘co-operative practices’), guardians of local autonomy and democracy, 
ancillaries to a national system of inspection and high-stakes testing and (against a 
background of decreased public funding in education) purveyors of economisation 
and efficiency. 
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A ‘processual view of neoliberalization’ (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 383) is a useful 
framework through which to explore the various elements (specifically, the range of 
interests, stakes and motives) that combine to produce situated practices of school 
governance in a co-operative trust setting.   A key focus of this section of the paper 
is the ways in which routines of neoliberal governance, of competition, choice and 
self-interest for example, are grafted onto an ‘inherited institutional landscape’ 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 184) that values cooperation, solidarity and 
mutuality.  To do this I draw on interview data taken from a case study of a 
secondary school situated in a rural area of England, hereafter referred to as 
Ballard’s Wood (pseudonym).  Ballard’s Wood is engaged in extensive collaboration 
and shared governance with many of its neighbouring primary schools, made 
possible through the acquisition of a co-operative trust, hereafter referred to as 
United Cluster Trust (UCT).  The case study material used in this paper was 
generated through a three-year research project funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) between 2012 and 2015 (Grant Reference: 
ES/K001299/1). 
 
Translations and refusals of neoliberalism 
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At the time of the research (2013) UCT was a cluster of several primary schools and 
one secondary school joined together through a co-operative trust with support from 
the school governors, teaching staff, parent constituencies, local charities, 
government authorities, private businesses and further education providers.  The 
collaborative trust agreement ensured that each school within the cluster retained its 
own separate committee structures and full governing body (and therefore a degree 
of autonomy) while at the same time being committed to a vision of power-sharing 
and shared governance, or what UCT member schools called ‘cluster governance’.   
 
Cluster governance was achieved through the creation of cross-school committees 
(legal, education performance and finance) designed to stretch budget capacity, 
target pupil premium spending more effectively on schools that needed it most, 
improve pupils’ transitions between schools and the continuation of targeted 
assistance across school phases for the most disadvantaged students and build a 
sense of collective security and shared responsibility.  Cluster governance was 
particularly important for schools in the area as funding for local government has 
diminished significantly to accommodate the growth of the academies programme 
and the outsourcing of public contracts to private companies and charities.  As Jerry 
(head teacher of Ballard’s Wood and founder of UCT) commented: ‘it’s about trying 
to provide a sustainable legacy and a sustainable way of working’.  The key 
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motivation to securing partnerships between local primary and secondary schools 
through the acquisition of a trust was therefore as much a pragmatic decision about 
improving economies of scale and allocative efficiency/equity as it was an ideological 
one about embracing co-operative values. 
 
The most important thing is that we develop some kind of shared services 
model in order to save money.  The motivation is far more about a sustainable 
legacy. (Jerry) 
 
Another key motivation for the schools involved was to use UCT to overcome some 
of the risks and vulnerabilities of operating as a stand-alone school and resisting 
capture from the monopolising tendencies of some large MATs seeking to run failing 
schools.  ‘I do feel less vulnerable actually.  I feel part of a bigger group’, said Becky 
(head teacher of Whitechapel).  Becky went on to say that, following the formation of 
UCT, competition between the UCT member schools ‘eroded’.  However, Becky also 
conceded that 
 
Whereas before I was like oh no, no, we [referring to Whitechapel] are the 
best.  Whereas at the end of the day we are different, we offer something 
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different….I mean we will always look to see how another school has done, of 
course you will, because, you know, you are accountable for your parents, 
and you don’t want your parents to start thinking oh, is the school down the 
road doing better than us?  You want your parents to be behind you so that 
you can be the very best.  But certainly now I recognise that what we have 
here is good, what other schools have in their situation is good, because 
actually we currently all have good status in Ofsted’s terms (emphasis added). 
 
Echoing this, Dominic (governor at Ballard’s Wood) added: ‘the schools within the 
cluster do compete because it’s the same old thing: pupils equals pounds’.  On this 
account, the UCT member schools engaged in simultaneous collaboration and 
competition to achieve partial congruence of stakes and interests while still 
maintaining competitive advantage in their local education market.  Cooperation and 
competition are therefore not mutually exclusive methods for school organisation but 
overlap and interpenetrate in productive and unpredictable ways.  A processual view 
of neoliberalisation (Peck and Tickell 2002) is sensitive to the geo-politics that shape 
and inflect the development (or non-development) of the neoliberalisation of specific 
organisations, peoples, spaces and places.  Moreover, a processual view of 
neoliberalisation maintains that active, dynamic space in which neoliberal projects 
can be seen as constituent parts of locally situated dilemmas, obligations and 
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normative commitments, rather than constitutive of them. This is evident in the 
discussion above in which competition and collaboration do not necessarily collide or 
conflict but converge to produce locally adapted solutions.  Similarly, UCT member 
schools engaged in simultaneous ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ accountability to 
accommodate and reconcile different sets of moral obligations, contractual duties 
and political commitments. 
 
We are accountable to the local authority, we are accountable to the DfE, we 
are accountable to Ofsted inspectors, and so on and so forth.  We are 
accountable to whatever is out there. (Lesley, UCT governor and governor at 
Ballard’s Wood) 
 
UCT member schools were committed to enhancing accountability to their 
stakeholders – ‘representative groups’, ‘community groups’ and ‘businesses’ for 
example (Jerry) – which was interwoven with their commitment to ‘high standards, or 
a good, high performance’, including a commitment to ‘making sure the budget is 
being spent properly, making sure you’ve got the right staff in the right place and so 
on, being aware of what’s going on out there in the big educational field and how it’s 
going to affect you’ (Lesley).  Upward and downward accountability therefore are not 
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mutually exclusive sets of goals since the moral impulse among governors and 
school leaders to serve their constituents is sometimes overlaid and aligned with 
duties and obligations that include responding to the wider economic and political 
pressures sustained by government, including pressures to be high performing and 
competitively placed to attract pupils and funding.  On this account, neoliberalisation 
involves co-articulation and adaption (Peck and Theodore 2015) in order to 
accommodate and combine a ‘matrix of dependencies, reciprocities and obligations’ 
(Trnka and Trundle 2014, p. 150).  As Ong (2006, p. 13) suggests, 
 
It therefore seems appropriate to study neoliberalism not as a ‘culture’ or a 
‘structure’ but as mobile calculative techniques of governing that can be 
decontextualized from their original sources and recontextualized in 
constellations of mutually constitutive and contingent relations. 
 
In the spirit of transparency and cooperation, UCT was made up of ‘associate 
members’ with a view to encouraging local primary schools not yet legally 
incorporated into the trust to build relationships with other schools within the cluster 
as part of a district-wide strategic development to raising school improvement.  The 
‘full members’ within the trust were schools that converted to the status of ‘grant 
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maintained’ or ‘foundation’ school (legally not dissimilar to the status of academies) 
thus removing themselves from the control of local government and giving them 
powers to integrate into UCT as a separate legal authority while retaining their own 
autonomy to operate outside it.  However, the UCT wanted to avoid the image of a 
‘breakaway school’, like ‘semi-private or anything like that’ (Becky), and therefore 
continued to defer to the judgement of local government on admissions and 
employment in the interests of preserving school-government partnerships.  These 
partnerships enabled UCT member schools to actively resist the kinds of 
depoliticisation entered into by schools who convert to academy status and extricate 
themselves from the authority of local government.  Instead UCT member schools 
elected to maintain their political commitments to local government (as guardians of 
public schools) while simultaneously pursuing new configurations and forms of 
agency as separate legal entities operating within the trust. 
 
In actual fact we are the admission authority.  We are but we are not because 
we still do it through the local authority.  We are the employment people but 
we don’t because we still do it through the local authority. (Becky) 
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The idea is not that it’s our local authority, you know, that it’s the boss of us.  
It’s a brains trust, it’s a strategic think tank, if you like, to help us solve, 
explore the issues that are facing you. (Jerry). 
 
UCT trustees were made up of head teachers and one nominated governor from 
each school within the cluster, all of whom met regularly at ‘cluster head meetings’ to 
deliberate and vote on long-term decisions that would benefit all schools, with a 
focus on cross-school budget spending, targeted assistance for ‘disadvantaged’ 
pupils, succession planning, systematic attainment, continuing professional 
development and curriculum progression.  At the same time, extensive brokering and 
negotiation was involved to secure certain arrangements, especially the 
development of new school partnerships.  Cara’s role as Director of Business and 
Community Strategy at Ballard’s Wood was integral to these developments as it 
concerned ‘brokering partnerships, supporting partnerships, understanding which 
partnerships and collaborations will support the school and which could become a 
drain’.  Collaboration and cooperation was therefore conditional on the advantages 
accrued to the trust: ‘So part of my role is to actually manage those and look for 
opportunities of working collaboratively that will be of advantage to the school, and to 
think about the sustainability of that’ (Cara).  UCT member schools were therefore 
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unwilling to commit to projects or share resources which they felt would not benefit 
them directly or might impede the sustainability of the UCT more generally. 
 
None of us are going to start lobbing resources at another school to save it, 
because, you know, our own governors won’t want that. We still want to retain 
our own identity and that was the important thing for us, that actually we were 
different schools and we didn’t want to become this sort of, you know, 
unrecognisable United Cluster Trust. We want to be recognised as different 
schools within the cluster offering a different ethos and different things’ 
(Becky) 
 
We’ve got an old, early Victorian school with many problems to the building.  I 
mean if we were to become the owner of that site and building that is always 
going to be a massive drain on resources ultimately…When we looked at that, 
and the work involved, we said no, we weren’t prepared to do it (Joseph, 
Chair of Governors at Close and Riley, and UCT trustee) 
 
A processual view of neoliberalisation is useful here for analysing the ‘creative 
processes of interpretation and recontextualisation’ (Ball, Maguire and Braun 2012, 
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p. 3) through which policy discourse is translated and implemented.  In the context of 
the inherited institutional landscape of the co-operative trust, neoliberalisation can be 
conceptualised as a messy hotchpotch of disparate elements in which the ‘politically 
guided intensification of market rule and commodification’ is always patterned and 
layered (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 184).   
 
The double binds of co-operative education 
In this paper I have adopted a processual view of neoliberalisation to explore how 
power-sharing and cooperation is achieved in the context of a co-operative trust, with 
a specific focus on the instability of the relationships forged through these 
arrangements and ‘the ways individuals act creatively for reasons of their own to 
create new forms of power’ (Bevir 2010, p. 426).  The case study of UCT above is 
also helpful for illustrating the fluidity and contingency of principles and practices of 
cooperation as some schools engage in risk assessment of the different benefits 
likely to be accrued through working with some schools over others.  Moreover, the 
case study material draws attention to the blurred boundaries separating competition 
and collaboration and upward and downward accountability as well as the cross-
cutting impulses through which they interpenetrate and overlap.  Illustrated through 
the case study are examples of the different ways schools are both implicated in 
routines of neoliberal governance as well as engaged in struggles of power that 
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actively resist and transform those forces.  The duty of co-operative schools to 
remain accountable to outside authorities and forces, namely the DFE, ESFA, Ofsted 
and the market more generally, brings into view a set of compromises and double 
binds that few co-operative schools seem unable to resolve or move beyond.  But 
rather than view these compromises as power struggles that undermine a radical 
vision of co-operative education, it is perhaps vital to see them as symptomatic of a 
refusal among some schools to augment themselves purely in the image of the 
market. 
 
A co-operative vision of education generates opportunities for the development of 
new partnerships built upon shared responsibility, mutuality and membership 
engagement; pedagogical processes with a focus on co-construction and student 
voice; and institutional formations (or relational formations to be more precise) 
characterised by democratic governance and civic engagement.  However, everyday 
school practices as outlined in the case study above are still wedded to elements of 
self-interest, competition and upward accountability, albeit framed by school 
governors and leaders through a moral prerogative to serve the children and families 
of the local community.  Local adaptions therefore make the idea of a coherent co-
operative ideology seem unsustainable, even undesirable, ‘given that co-operative 
values and principles allow for flexible interpretation’ (Woodin 2015, p. 6).  On this 
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account, co-operative schools are by their very nature bound to a set of inescapable 
tensions, ambivalences and uneasy alignments as they stand at the intersection of 
competing interests and demands, both local and national, governmental and non-
governmental (also see Davidge, Facer and Schostak 2015).  But to view these 
processes as fragile and contingent is precisely what makes them democratic and 
experimental. 
 
From this perspective, we must remain circumspect of any ‘synchronic’, 
‘institutionalist’ or ‘structuralist’ account which reduces schools either to tidy 
expressions of routines of neoliberal governance or to autonomous spheres for the 
exclusive practice of democratic co-operation and participation.  Instead, it is 
necessary to be attentive to the multiplicity of discourses that continually shape 
practice and produce new combinations and alignments.  A processual view of 
neoliberalisation is particularly useful to this task as it undermines a view of 
neoliberalism as omnipresent and omnipotent (Clarke 2008) and instead opens up 
important analytic spaces through which to view the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of institutions within and against these forces.  These locally adapted 
solutions and responses reflect the ‘different modes of insertion’ (Clarke 2008, p. 
137) through which state-regulated imperatives and market-governed logics are 
rearticulated to compliment pre-existing value systems and normative commitments.  
31 
 
Moreover, a processual view of neoliberalisation forces into perspective the blurred 
boundaries and intersecting positions that characterise ‘neoliberal work’, in effect 
revealing tensions and ambivalences in the way that neoliberal projects and its 
exigencies are struggled over in the context of local projects and politics. 
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